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Abstract—Source Address Validation (SAV) is a standard
aimed at discarding packets with spoofed source IP addresses.
The absence of SAV for outgoing traffic has been known as a
root cause of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and
received widespread attention. While less obvious, the absence
of inbound filtering enables an attacker to appear as an internal
host of a network and may reveal valuable information about the
network infrastructure. Inbound IP spoofing may amplify other
attack vectors such as DNS cache poisoning or the recently dis-
covered NXNSAttack. In this paper, we present the preliminary
results of the Closed Resolver Project that aims at mitigating the
problem of inbound IP spoofing. We perform the first Internet-
wide active measurement study to enumerate networks that filter
or do not filter incoming packets by their source address, for both
the IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces. To achieve this, we identify
closed and open DNS resolvers that accept spoofed requests
coming from the outside of their network. The proposed method
provides the most complete picture of inbound SAV deployment
by network providers. Our measurements cover over 55 %
IPv4 and 27 % IPv6 Autonomous Systems (AS) and reveal that
the great majority of them are fully or partially vulnerable to
inbound spoofing. By identifying dual-stacked DNS resolvers, we
additionally show that inbound filtering is less often deployed for
IPv6 than it is for IPv4. Overall, we discover 13.9 K IPv6 open
resolvers that can be exploited for amplification DDoS attacks—
13 times more than previous work. Furthermore, we uncover
4.25 M IPv4 and 103 K IPv6 vulnerable closed resolvers that
could only be detected thanks to our spoofing technique, and that
pose a significant threat when combined with the NXNSAttack.
Index Terms—IP spoofing, Source Address Validation, DNS
resolvers, IPv6, dual-stack.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Internet relies on IP packets to enable communicationbetween hosts with the destination and source addresses
specified in packet headers. However, there is no packet-level
authentication mechanism to ensure that the source address has
not been altered [1]. The modification of a source IP address
is referred to as “IP spoofing”. It results in the anonymity
of the sender and prevents a packet from being traced to
its origin. This vulnerability has been leveraged to launch
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks that can be made
even more effective using reflection [2]. Because it is not
possible in general to prevent packet header modification,
concerted efforts have been undertaken to prevent spoofed
packets from reaching potential victims. This goal can be
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achieved by filtering packets at the network edge, formalized
in RFC 2827, and called Source Address Validation (SAV) [3].
Given the prevalent role of IP spoofing in cyberattacks, there
is a need to estimate the level of SAV deployment by network
providers. Projects such as Spoofer [4] already enumerate
networks that do not implement packet filtering. However, a
great majority of this existing work concentrates on outbound
SAV and filtering since it can prevent reflection-based DDoS
attacks near their origin [5]. While less obvious, the lack of
inbound filtering enables an external attacker to masquerade
as an internal host of a network, which may reveal valuable
information about the network infrastructure that is usually
not seen from the outside. Inbound IP spoofing can serve as a
vector for zone poisoning attacks [6] that may lead to domain
hijacking, or cache poisoning attacks [7] even if the Domain
Name System (DNS) resolver is correctly configured as a
closed resolver. A closed resolver only accepts DNS queries
from known clients and does so by matching the source IP
address of a query against a list of allowed addresses.
The lack of SAV for inbound traffic can also have devas-
tating consequences when combined with the NXDOMAIN
attack (also known as the Water Torture Attack) [8] or the
recently discovered NXNSAttack [9]. Both attacks enable
Denial-of-Service against both recursive resolvers and author-
itative servers, with a maximum packet amplification factor of
1620 for the NXNSAttack [9]. IP spoofing is not required for
this attack to work, because any client can attack a resolver if
it is allowed to query it. However, IP spoofing can greatly
increase the number of affected resolvers by allowing an
external attacker to target closed DNS resolvers: the attacker
simply needs to masquerade as a legitimate client by spoofing
its source IP address. Deploying inbound SAV at the edge
of a network is an effective way of protecting closed DNS
resolvers from this type of external attacks.
In this paper, we present the results of the Closed Resolver
Project [10]. The goal is to enumerate networks vulnerable
to inbound spoofing Internet-wide as the first step in estimat-
ing the scale of the problem. We also aim at studying the
persistence of the vulnerability over time and launching a no-
tification campaign for all the affected parties. We extend our
previous work [11] and make the following main contributions:
(1) We exhaustively enumerate networks that do not
deploy inbound SAV for IPv4. We propose a new method
to identify networks that do not filter inbound traffic with
spoofed IP addresses. We perform Internet-wide scans of all
BGP prefixes maintained by RouteViews [12] for the entire
2IPv4 address space. This allows us to identify closed and open
DNS resolvers in each routable network of the Internet. We
achieve this goal by sending a spoofed DNS request of type
A to each routable IP address: as a source address for our
request, we spoof an IP address that is adjacent to the target
IP address. That is, when sending a request to IPX , we choose
X + 1 as a source IP address. If there is no filtering in either
transit networks or the network edge, our request is received
by the target: assuming the target is a DNS resolver and our
spoofed address matches a list of allowed clients, the resolver
will resolve our A request. Because we spoofed the source
IP address, the response from the resolver is not routed back
to our scanner, preventing us from analyzing it. However, we
control the authoritative name server for the queried domains:
from these authoritative name servers, we can observe queries
sent by the resolver under test, either directly or through a
chain of forwarding resolvers. Overall, this method identifies
networks that do not correctly filter incoming packets, without
the need for a vantage point inside the network itself. The only
requirement is that the network contains a—possibly closed—
DNS resolver.
(2) We enumerate IPv6 networks not deploying in-
bound SAV. IPv6 adoption has been gradually increasing in
recent years [13]. Consequently, IPv6 Internet is becoming
an attractive attack vector, partly due to network operators
not protecting the IPv6 portion of their networks as well as
IPv4 [14]. Given the number of available addresses, a complete
scan of the IPv6 address space (as explained previously for
IPv4) is not computationally feasible. Instead, there are other
ways to discover active IPv6 hosts, for example, through DNS
zone transfers [15], [16]. One source of responsive addresses is
the IPv6 Hitlist Service [17]. To enrich this list, we also deploy
a two-level DNS zone infrastructure that forces resolvers to
use both IPv4 and IPv6 to resolve our domain names, thus
discovering IPv6 resolvers as a by-product of an IPv4 scan.
Then we perform a scan of the enumerated IPv6 addresses
using the same method as for the IPv4 address space.
(3) We enumerate IPv4 and IPv6 networks deploying
inbound SAV. The above technique, when applied alone, can
reveal the absence of inbound SAV at the network edge.
However, we would also like to confirm the presence of
inbound SAV. To achieve this, we also send unspoofed DNS A
queries, which allows us to identify 3,607,008 open resolvers
for IPv4 and 13,899 open resolvers for IPv6. For IPv6, this
is 13 times more than the previous work [18]. If these open
resolvers reply to the unspoofed requests but not to the spoofed
ones, we can infer the presence of SAV for incoming traffic
either at the network edge or in transit networks. By doing this,
we can detect both the absence and the presence of inbound
packet filtering.
(4) We combine different methods to check SAV com-
pliance in both directions. We retrieve the Spoofer data
and deploy a method proposed by Mauch [19] to infer the
absence and the presence of outbound SAV. This way, we
can study the SAV deployment policies per provider in both
directions. Previous work demonstrated the difficulty in in-
centivizing providers to deploy filtering for outbound traffic
due to misaligned economic incentives: implementing SAV for
outbound traffic benefits other networks and not the network of
the deployment [20]. This work shows how the deployment of
SAV for inbound traffic protects the provider’s own network.
(5) We compare SAV deployment status over IPv4 and
IPv6. We first do it at the individual host level by identifying
potentially dual-stacked DNS resolvers. For every (IPv4, IPv6)
address pair, to confirm that both addresses belong to the same
host, we gather DNS-level information, such as the BIND
version and Pointer (PTR) records. We also use other general-
purpose fingerprinting tools to identify services running on
ports 22, 80, 123, 443 and 587. Hardware and software
information about each pair gives evidence whether the two
addresses belong to the same host or not. As single dual-stack
machines are likely to exhibit the security configuration of
the whole BGP prefix and autonomous system [14], we then
compare filtering policies at the level of autonomous systems.
As a result, we show that SAV is less often deployed for
IPv6 than it is for IPv4, both at the autonomous system and
individual host levels.
(6) We analyze the geographical distribution of resolvers
and networks vulnerable to inbound spoofing. Identifying
the countries that do not comply with the SAV standard is the
first step in mitigating the issue by contacting local Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background on Source Address Validation. Section III
analyzes related work. Section IV introduces our methodology.
Section V provides the main results and analyzes them,
including a comparison of IPv4 and IPv6. Section VI ana-
lyzes the geographic location of vulnerable networks. Lastly,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Source address validation was proposed in 2000 in RFC
2827 as a result of a growing number of DDoS attacks.
The RFC defined the notion of ingress filtering—discarding
any packets with source addresses not following filtering
rules. This operation is the most effective when applied at
the network edge [3]. RFC 3704 proposed different ways to
implement SAV including static access control lists (ACLs)
and reverse path forwarding [21]. Packet filtering can be
applied in two directions: inbound to a customer (coming from
the outside to the customer network) and outbound from a
customer (coming from inside the customer network to the
outside). The lack of SAV in any of these directions may result
in different security threats.
Attackers benefit from the absence of outbound SAV to
launch DDoS attacks, in particular, amplification attacks.
Adversaries make use of public services prone to amplifi-
cation [22] to which they send requests on behalf of their
victims by spoofing their source IP addresses. The victim
is then overloaded with the traffic coming from the services
rather than from the attacker. In this scenario, the origin of
the attack is not traceable. One of the most successful attacks
against GitHub resulted in traffic of 1.35 Tbps: attackers
redirected Memcached responses by spoofing their source
addresses [23]. In such scenarios, spoofed source addresses
3are usually random globally routable IPs. In some cases, to
impersonate an internal host, a spoofed IP address may be
from the inside target network, which reveals the absence of
inbound SAV [21].
Pretending to be an internal host reveals information about
the inner network structure, such as the presence of closed
DNS resolvers that resolve only on behalf of clients within
the same network. Attackers can further exploit closed re-
solvers, for instance, for leveraging misconfigurations of the
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [24]. In case of not correctly
deployed SPF, attackers can trigger closed DNS resolvers to
perform an unlimited number of requests thus introducing a
potential DoS attack vector.
The absence of SAV for inbound traffic may also have
serious consequences when combined with the NXDOMAIN
attack (also known as the Water Torture Attack) [8] or the
recently discovered NXNSAttack [9]. Both attacks enable
Denial-of-Service against both recursive resolvers and author-
itative servers. The NXNSAttack exploits the way recursive
resolvers deal with NS referral responses (domain delegations)
that provide the mapping between a given domain name and
its authoritative name server without a glue-record, i.e., the
IP addresses of the name server. The maximum packet DDoS
amplification factor of the NXNSAttack is 1620 [9]. It also
saturates the cache of the resolver, even of a closed one, if the
attack uses IP spoofing and inbound SAV is not in place.
The possibility of impersonating another host on the victim
network can also assist in the zone poisoning attack [6]. A
master DNS server, authoritative for a given domain, may be
configured to accept non-secure DNS dynamic updates from
a DHCP server on the same network [25]. Thus, sending a
spoofed update from the outside with an IP address of that
DHCP server will modify the content of the zone file [6].
The attack may lead to domain hijacking. Another way to
target closed resolvers is to perform DNS cache poisoning [7].
An attacker can send a spoofed DNS A request for a specific
domain to a closed resolver, followed by forged replies before
the arrival of the response from the genuine authoritative
server. In this case, the users who query the same domain will
be redirected to where the attacker specified until the forged
DNS entry reaches its Time To Live (TTL).
Despite the knowledge of the above-mentioned attack sce-
narios and the costs of the damage they may incur, it was
shown that SAV is not yet widely deployed. Lichtblau et al.
surveyed 84 network operators to learn whether they deployed
SAV and what challenges they faced [26]. The reasons for not
performing packet filtering included incidentally filtering out
legitimate traffic, equipment limitations, and lack of a direct
economic benefit. In case of outbound SAV, the compliant
network cannot become an attack source but can be attacked
itself. Performing inbound SAV protects networks from direct
threats as described above, which is beneficial from an eco-
nomic perspective.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Source Address Validation
Table I summarizes several methods proposed to infer SAV
deployment. They differ in terms of the filtering direction (in-
TABLE I
METHODS TO INFER DEPLOYMENT OF SOURCE ADDRESS VALIDATION
Method Direction
Presence/
Absence
Remote
Relies on
misconfigu-
rations
Spoofer [2], [4] both both no no
Forwarder-based [19], [5] outbound absence yes yes
Traceroute loops [27] outbound absence yes yes
Passive detection [26] outbound both no no
Spoofer-IX [28] outbound both no no
Our method [10] inbound both yes no
bound/outbound), whether they infer the presence or absence
of SAV, whether measurements can be done remotely or on
a vantage point inside the tested network, and if the method
relies on existing network misconfigurations.
The Spoofer project deploys a client-server infrastructure
mainly based on volunteers (and “crowdworkers” hired for
one study trough five crowdsourcing platforms [29]) that
run the client software from inside a network. The active
probing client sends both unspoofed and spoofed packets to
the Spoofer server either periodically or when it detects a new
network. The server inspects received packets (if any) and
analyzes whether spoofing is allowed and to what extent [1].
For every client running the software, its /24 IPv4 address
block (or /40 for IPv6) and the autonomous system number
(ASN) are identified and measurement results are made pub-
licly available1. This approach identifies the absence and the
presence of SAV in both directions. The results obtained by
the Spoofer project provide the most confident picture of the
deployment of outbound SAV and have covered tests from
7,750 ASes since 2015. However, those that are not aware of
this issue or do not deploy SAV are less likely to run Spoofer
on their networks.
A more practical approach is to perform such measurements
remotely. Khrer et al. [5] scanned for open DNS resolvers, as
proposed by Mauch [19], to detect the absence of outbound
SAV. They leveraged the misconfiguration of forwarding re-
solvers. The misbehaving resolver forwards a request to a
recursive resolver with either not changing the packet source
address to its own address or by sending back the response
to the client with the source IP of the recursive resolver.
They fingerprinted those forwarders and found out that they
were mostly embedded devices and routers. Misconfigured
forwarders originated from 2,692 autonomous systems. We
refer to this technique as forwarder-based.
Lone et al. [27] proposed another method that does not
require a vantage point inside a tested network. When packets
are sent to a customer network with an address that is routable
but not allocated, this packet is sent back to the provider router
without changing its source IP address. The packet, having
the source IP address of the machine that sent it, should be
dropped by the router because the source IP does not belong to
the customer network. The method detected 703 autonomous
systems not deploying outbound SAV.
While the above-mentioned methods rely on actively gen-
erated (whether spoofed or not) packets, Lichtblau et al. [26]
1https://spoofer.caida.org/summary.php
4passively observed and analyzed inter-domain traffic ex-
changed between more than 700 networks at a large IXP.
They classified observed traffic into bogon, unrouted, invalid,
and valid based on the source IP addresses and AS paths.
The most conservative estimation identified 393 networks
where the invalid traffic originated from. Another methodology
to detect spoofing at the IXP level, called Spoofer-IX, was
developed by Mller et al. [28]. The traffic classification took
into account AS business relationships, asymmetric routing,
and traffic engineering. It was deployed at one mid-sized IXP
for five weeks and identified the upper bound of spoofed traffic
to be 40 Mbps.
We are the first to propose a method to detect the absence
of inbound SAV that is remote and does not rely on existing
misconfigurations. Instead, we use local DNS resolvers (both
open and closed) to infer the absence of packet filtering and
the presence of SAV either at transit networks or the edge.
B. Dual-Stack
Several researchers used DNS to obtain candidate (IPv4,
IPv6) address pairs that likely indicate to be the same physical
machine (also called dual-stacked). Berger et al. [30] devel-
oped two techniques—passive and active, to find such pairs.
The passive method has been deployed over the existing pro-
duction infrastructure that consists of a two-level authoritative
nameserver hierarchy in which the first-level server, reachable
over IPv4, returns A records of the second-level server. In
its DNS response, it also encodes the IPv4 address of the
contacting client. Each request arriving at the second-level
nameserver over IPv6 can be paired with the initial IPv4 query.
This methodology is not restricted to open resolvers and does
not actively generate any DNS requests. It discovered 674k
candidate pairs during a period of six months. The active
technique relies on sending requests to open resolvers for such
multi-level domains, which implies switching between IPv4
and IPv6 protocols. In a one-day measurement session, 7,000
open resolvers were probed 200 times and revealed 41,000
address pairs.
Hendriks et al. [18] enumerated the population of open IPv6
resolvers to analyze whether they could be used as efficient
DDoS amplifiers. They first performed an Internet-wide scan
to find open resolvers over IPv4. Those resolvers were queried
for specifically-crafted domains that could only be reached by
traversing from IPv4 to IPv6. This method discovered 1.49M
unique candidate pairs and 1,038 unique IPv6 resolvers.
The two approaches described above do not necessarily find
candidate pairs that are single dual-stacked machines (also
called siblings). There is a need to validate those results. The
technique of Beverly et al. [31] is not limited to DNS resolvers.
Beverly et al. collected TCP-level information such as option
signatures and timestamps. The algorithm was 97% accurate
in identifying sibling relationships. In 2017, Scheitle et al. [32]
developed a machine-learning algorithm that also gathered var-
ious TCP-level features (options, timestamp clock frequency,
timestamp value, clock offset, etc.) and calculated a variable
clock skew. The precision of the algorithm exceeded 99%.
Czyz et al. [14] proved that the IPv6 Internet is more
open than IPv4. They developed two candidate lists: router
drakkardnsv4.com
IPv
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Fig. 1. DNS zone setup. Rectangles with solid lines are nameservers that
host corresponding DNS zones. Those are under our control. The .com zone
(dashed) only contains glue records for our domains and is out of our control.
Vertices indicate the network protocol over which zones are reachable.
IP pairs and pairs derived from DNS zone files. They probed
all addresses on various ports for services expected to run on
routers and DNS servers. To ascertain that some pairs were
indeed dual-stacked machines, they collected fingerprinting
information on the following applications: HTTP, HTTPS,
SNMP, NTP, SSH, and MySQL. Based on this information,
96% of router and 97% of nameserver pairs, open on at least
one of the above-mentioned ports, were confirmed to be the
same physical machines.
We deploy a two-level hierarchical DNS zone infrastructure
that forces a recursive resolver to switch from IPv4 to IPv6
(and vice versa) to resolve our domain names. Whenever we
detect that an IPv4 or IPv6 resolver is also reachable over IPv6
and IPv4, respectively, we consider such address pairs to be
dual-stack candidates. To increase the number of dual-stack
candidates, we send spoofed packets and target both open and
closed resolvers. We then fingerprint them on different ports
to gather evidence on whether each pair belongs to the same
physical machine.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. DNS Zone Setup
The core idea of our methodology is built around sending
hand-crafted DNS requests for domains reachable over: i) only
IPv4, ii) only IPv6, iii) require switching from IPv4 to IPv6,
or iv) require switching from IPv6 to IPv4. Figure 1 describes
the structure of our DNS zones. We set up zone files for two
domains (drakkardnsv4.com and drakkardnsv6.com) on
two distinct machines. The associated glue records are added
to the .com zone via the registrar control panel. Importantly,
the first domain is reachable only over IPv4 and the second
domain only over IPv6. Both have subdomains prefixed v4
and v6 with zone files hosted on another two servers, IPv4 and
IPv6-connected, respectively. Consequently, there are domain
names of four types:
• v4.drakkardnsv4.com (only IPv4)
• v6.drakkardnsv6.com (only IPv6)
• v4.drakkardnsv6.com (IPv6→ IPv4)
• v6.drakkardnsv4.com (IPv4→ IPv6)
B. IPv4 Spoofing Scan
We developed an efficient scanner that sends hand-crafted
DNS A record request packets. We run the scanner on a
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Fig. 2. Spoofing IPv4 scan setup. We set up devices on the left-hand side
(scanner, authoritative nameservers) and have no control over the remaining
infrastructure.
machine inside a network that does not deploy outbound
SAV so that we can send packets with spoofed IP addresses.
When a resolver inside a network vulnerable to inbound
spoofing performs query resolution, we observe it on our
authoritative DNS servers. To prevent caching and to be
able to identify the true originator in case of forwarding,
every time we query the following unique domain name:
a random string, the hex-encoded resolver IP address (the
destination of our query), a scan identifier, the IP version
subdomain and the domain name itself. An example domain
name that is only reachable through IPv4 name servers is
qGPDBe.02ae52c7.s1.v4.drakkardnsv4.com.
Figure 2 shows the scanning setup for the 1.2.3.0/24
network. In step 1, the scanner sends one spoofed packet to
each host of this network, thus packets to 254 destinations in
total. The spoofed source IP address is always the next one
after the destination. When the spoofed DNS packet arrives at
the destination network edge (therefore it has not been filtered
anywhere in transit), there are three possible cases:
• Packet filtering in place. The packet filter inspects the
packet source address and detects that such a packet
cannot arrive from the outside because the address block
is allocated inside the network. Thus, the filter drops the
packet.
• No packet filtering in place and nothing prevents
the packet from entering the network. If the packet
destination is 1.2.3.5, the address of the local resolver
(step 2), it receives a DNS A record request from what
looks to be another host on the same network and resolves
the query. If the destination is not the local resolver, it
will drop the packet. However, the scanner will eventually
reach all the hosts on the network and the local resolver
if there is one. In some cases, the closed DNS resolver
may be configured to refuse queries coming from its local
area network (for example, if the whole separate network
is dedicated to the infrastructure).
• Other cases. Regardless of the presence or absence of
filtering, packets may be dropped due to reasons not
related to IP spoofing such as network congestion [1].
In this study, we distinguish between two types of local
resolvers: forwarders (or proxies) that forward queries to
other recursive resolvers and non-forwarders (non-proxies) that
resolve queries they receive. Therefore, the non-forwarding
local resolver (1.2.3.5) inspects the query that looks as if
it was sent from 1.2.3.6 and performs the resolution by
iteratively querying the root (step 3) and the top-level domain
name (step 4) servers until it reaches our authoritative DNS
servers in steps 5 and 6. Alternatively, it forwards the query
to another recursive resolver that repeats the same procedure
as described above for non-forwarders. In step 7, the DNS A
query response is sent to the spoofed source (1.2.3.6).
We aim at scanning the whole IPv4 address space, yet
taking into account only globally routable and allocated ad-
dress ranges. We use the data maintained by the RouteViews
Project [12] to get all the IP blocks currently present in the
BGP routing table and send spoofed DNS A requests to all
the hosts of the prefixes.
C. IPv6 Spoofing Scan
The complete scan of the IPv6 space is not possible, even
considering only networks present in the BGP routing table.
Our source of active IPv6 addresses is composed of the
IPv6 addresses discovered by us, as later explained in Sec-
tion IV-E, and the IPv6 Hitlist Service [17]. On the day of the
measurement, the IPv6 Hitlist Service contains 386,348,802
unique IPv6 addresses. We note that some of them belong to
aliased prefixes. Every IP address belonging to such a prefix
is responsive. We only keep one address from each aliased
prefix, which results in 270,703,379 addresses for scanning.
We send spoofed DNS A requests to all hosts from our
hitlist and spoof the source to be the next IP address af-
ter the target. The format of the domain name is sim-
ilar to the IPv4 one: qGPDBe.long_int(ipv6).s1.v6.
drakkardnsv6.com. We convert the IPv6 address into its
long integer representation to uniquely identify the initial
query destination. This scan also implies resolution over a
single network protocol, namely IPv6. We still send requests
for the DNS A record, as changing the network protocol does
not influence the retrieved resource records.
D. Open Resolver Scan
In parallel, we perform an open resolver scan over IPv4
and IPv6 by sending DNS A requests with genuine source IP
addresses of the scanner. To avoid temporal changes, we send
a non-spoofed query just after the spoofed one to the same
host. The format of a non-spoofed query is almost the same
as the spoofed one. The only difference is the scan identifier:
qGPDBe.02ae52c7.n1.v4.drakkardnsv4.com
qGPDBe.long_int(ipv6).n1.v6.drakkardnsv6.com
If we receive a request on our authoritative DNS server, it
means that we have reached an open resolver. Moreover, if
this open resolver did not resolve the spoofed query, we infer
the presence of inbound SAV either in transit or at the tested
network edge.
We also analyze traffic on the machine on which we run the
scanner to deploy the forwarder-based method, as explained
6in Section III. We distinguish between two cases: the source
of the DNS response is the same as the original destination
and the source is different [19], [5]. The latter implies that
either the source IP address of the original query was not
rewritten when the query was forwarded to another recursive
resolver or the source IP address of the recursive resolver was
not changed on the way back. In either case, such a packet
should not be able to leave its network if there is the outbound
SAV in place. In Section V-G, we analyze the results from
the forwarder-based method and compare the policies of SAV
deployment in both directions.
E. Identifying Dual-Stack Candidates
To compare the level of SAV deployment over IPv4 and
IPv6 at the machine level, we first collect candidate address
pairs. We then fingerprint them to gather the evidence that
they are siblings. By sending requests for domains that require
changing network protocol, we reveal whether DNS resolvers
have any form of connectivity over the other network protocol.
It is also a way to learn more IPv6 addresses in addition to
the hitlist service.
As explained in Section IV-B, we deal with two types of
DNS resolvers: forwarders and non-forwarders. Forwarders are
likely to be a part of a complex DNS infrastructure, not visible
from our authoritative nameservers, which includes, but is not
limited to, load balancing and DNS cache sharing [14]. Thus,
natural candidates for dual-stack testing are non-forwarders.
Even if IPv4 non-forwarders may forward IPv6 requests (or the
other way around), we consider them better sibling candidates.
During the spoofing scan (IPv4 or IPv6), we continuously
process traffic captures from our nameservers. It is crucial
to do it on-the-fly to avoid temporal changes such as IP
address churn [33]. When we find non-forwarders, we send
them requests with such domains that imply switching to the
other network protocol. The domain name formats for IPv4
and IPv6 non-forwarders are:
qGPDBe.02ae52c7.nf.s1.v6.drakkardnsv4.com
qGPDBe.long_int(ipv6).nf.s1.v4.drakkardnsv6.com
We also send similar queries to the remaining IPv4 resolvers
(forwarders and sources of queries), but exclude the nf part
from the domain name.
The second round of the capture analysis retrieves requests
containing the above-mentioned domain names. From non-
forwarding requests, we retrieve the source IP and the domain-
encoded address. The two form a sibling candidate pair. The
requests coming from forwarding IPv4 resolvers are only
used to reveal IPv6 addresses that we scan as described in
Section IV-C.
F. Fingerprinting
We performed a smaller preliminary measurement and gath-
ered 1,000 candidate pairs. We scanned all the addresses with
Nmap [34] for 1,000 most common ports [35]. Our candi-
dates were open on ports: 22 (SSH), 53 (DNS), 80 (HTTP),
443 (HTTPS), and 587 (SMTP). We also checked port 123
(NTP), known to be a powerful DDoS amplifier [22][5], and
found that more than 10% of addresses were open. Open
ports may reveal the running software version, underlying
operating system, and other pieces of information, such as
public keys and certificates, however, we consider the fraction
of the remaining open ports negligible and not suitable for
fingerprinting. Thus, we deploy the following techniques to
gather the evidence whether the two addresses belong to the
same physical machine.
DNS: A pointer (PTR) DNS resource record is the mapping
between an IP address and a domain name. It is a recom-
mended practice to have a hostname configured for every
IP address [36]. Nevertheless, it was shown that only 1.2
billion responsive IPv4 addresses (28.17% of all IPv4 space)
have an associated PTR record [37]. We check for an exact
match between returned IPv4/IPv6 domain names, as it is
not uncommon for shared domain names to represent a single
machine [14]. Unless explicitly hidden, a DNS resolver also
replies to CHAOS class queries for version.bind record
with the exact installed software version. Example return
values include “9.11.10-RedHat-9.11.10-1.fc29” or “unbound
1.10.0”. We look for candidate pairs for which the same
version is displayed for both. We ignore those cases when
the arbitrary string is returned.
NTP: We fingerprint resolvers over UDP port 123 using
the Nmap scanner. The NTP standard [38] specifies a special
packet header variable called version that reveals the running
software. We retrieve it using ntp-info NSE script [39],
which not only returns the NTP server version but also the
underlying system information [14].
SMTP: Port 587 is used for email submission by email
clients and servers [40]. An extension to SMTP allows secure
communication over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) pro-
tocol [41]. We use openssl tool2 to initiate a connection and
to obtain the server certificate.
HTTP: We use the ZGrab 2.0 application layer scanner3 to
get home pages, headers, and certificates for all the remaining
protocols [42]. The software initiates a GET request to the
potential web server over HTTP. In case of a successful
connection, there may be an HTTP Server header field
with the webserver software version, which we retrieve and
examine.
HTTPS: Web servers delivering content over the TLS
protocol provide more information about the machine in
addition to what we can learn with HTTP. The TLS specifi-
cation [43] defines a handshake protocol between the client
and the server. The server responds to the client request
with the ServerHello message. The parameters we retrieve
are: cipher_suite and server_version (the TLS version
chosen by the webserver based on what is proposed by the
client). We also check the Certificate message for the returned
certificate and ServerKeyExchange message for the actual
used tls_version [14].
SSH: Machines open on port 22 provide us with the SSH
software version, the server public key fingerprint, and the
length of the key [14].
2https://www.openssl.org/
3https://github.com/zmap/zgrab2
7G. Filtering Levels
Each request received on our authoritative name server
reveals the IP address of the original target of the query. We
can associate it with the longest matching BGP prefix and its
ASN as it appears in the RouteViews data [12]. For a more
fine-grained analysis, we take /24 IPv4 and /40 IPv6 networks.
This granularity allows us to evaluate the SAV practices at
different levels:
• Autonomous systems: while based on a few received
queries, we cannot by any means conclude on the filtering
policies of the whole AS—they reveal SAV compliance
for a part of it [2], [4], [27], [20]. We also compare SAV
deployment for IPv4 and IPv6, as autonomous systems
are known to contain both types of networks [44].
• Longest matching BGP prefixes: as the provider ASes
may sub-allocate their address space to their customers
by prefix delegation [45], the analysis of the SAV deploy-
ment at the longest matching prefix is another commonly
used unit of analysis [2], [20].
• /24 (IPv4) and /40 (IPv6) networks: these are the smallest
units of measuring the SAV deployment used so far by
the existing methods [4], [20].
• Individual hosts: packet filtering can also be config-
ured per individual IP addresses. Moreover, dual-stacked
resolvers may have different security policies in IPv4
and IPv6 parts and, consequently, different packet filter-
ing [14].
H. Limitations
While we aimed at designing a universal method to detect
the deployment of inbound SAV at the network edge, our
approach has some limitations that may impact the accuracy
of the obtained results. We rely on one main assumption—the
presence of an (open or closed) DNS resolver or a proxy in
a tested network. In case of the absence of one of them, we
cannot conclude on the filtering policies. If the probed resolver
is closed, our method may only confirm that a particular
network does not perform SAV for inbound traffic, at least
for some part of its IP address space. Only the presence of
an open DNS resolver may reveal the SAV presence assuming
that the transit networks do not deploy SAV.
From our results, we often cannot unequivocally conclude
on the general policies of operators of, for example, larger
autonomous systems. Some parts of an AS, a BGP prefix, or
even a /24 IPv4 (/40 IPv6) network may be configured to allow
spoofed packets to enter one subnetwork and to filter spoofed
packets in another one.
The scanner sending spoofed packets should itself be lo-
cated in the network not performing SAV for outgoing traffic.
Still, even if a spoofed query leaves our network, it may
be filtered by some transit networks and never reach the
tested destination. Therefore, we plan to test our method from
different vantage points.
There are several reasons, apart from deploying SAV, why
we have no data for certain IP address blocks. Packet losses
and temporary network failures are some of the reasons for not
receiving queries from all the target hosts [33]. To overcome
this limitation, we plan to repeat our measurements regularly
and study the persistence of this vulnerability over time.
I. Ethical Considerations
To make sure that our study follows the ethical rules of
network scanning, yet providing complete results, we adopt
the recommended best practices [46], [47]. For the IPv4 scan,
we aggregate the BGP routing table to eliminate overlapping
prefixes. In this way, we send no more than two DNS A
request packets (spoofed and non-spoofed) to every tested
host. We also make sure that the IPv6 hitlist only includes
one address from each aliased prefix. Due to packet losses, we
potentially miss some results, but we accept this limitation not
to disrupt the normal operation of tested networks. In addition,
we randomize our input list for the scanner so that we do not
send consecutive requests to the same network (apart from two
consecutive spoofed and non-spoofed packets). Our scanning
activities are spread over 15 days.
We set up a website for this project on closedresolver.
com and provided all the queried domains and the finger-
printing server with a description of our project as well as
the contact information if someone wants to exclude his/her
networks from testing. We have received 9 requests from
operators and excluded 29,360,925 IPv4 addresses from our
future scans, as well as two IPv6 prefixes (/128 and /48).
We also exclude those addresses from our analysis. We do
not publicly reveal the source address validation policies of
individual networks and AS operators. Yet, website visitors
can see the results for the network they connect from. We also
plan a notification campaign through CSIRTs and by directly
informing the operators of affected networks.
V. INFERRING PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF SAV
We have been performing spoofing scans since July 2019.
For this study, we use data from the scan carried out in March
2020. First, we scanned the whole routable IPv4 address space,
as described in Section IV-B. In parallel, we identified IPv4
open resolvers (Section IV-D) and queried all the IPv4 non-
forwarders for the IPv6-only zone (Section IV-E). We found
dual-stack candidate address pairs as well as additional respon-
sive IPv6 addresses for the IPv6 hitlist. We then repeated the
spoofing and open resolver scans in the IPv6 address space.
By querying non-forwarders for the IPv4-only zone, we found
more dual-stack candidate pairs.
In total, we sent 5,662,320,868 IPv4 requests (half of them
spoofed), 541,406,758 requests using the IPv6 hitlist (half of
them spoofed) and 211,282 requests to IPv6 addresses revealed
during the traversal scan from IPv4 to IPv6-only zones (half
of them spoofed). We collected dual-stack candidate pairs by
sending 15,936,102 requests (half of them spoofed) requiring
traversal from IPv4 to IPv6 and 167,812 requests (half of them
spoofed) requiring traversal from IPv6 to IPv4. Finally, we sent
7 different requests to each IP address in 81,582 candidate
pairs to collect fingerprints (1,142,148 packets in total). All
the measurements took 15 days.
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SPOOFING SCAN RESULTS
Metric
IPv4 IPv6
Number Proportion (%) Number Proportion (%)
All 6,084,302 93.70 44,628 41.06
DNS forwarders Open 2,203,682 36.22 3,380 7.57
Closed 3,880,620 63.78 41,248 92.43
All 409,394 6.30 64,067 58.94
DNS non-forwarders Open 38,825 9.48 2,303 3.59
Closed 370,569 90.52 61,764 96.41
Vulnerable to spoofing
/24 IPv4 networks 938,472 8.41 - -
/40 IPv6 networks - - 7,698 -
BGP prefixes 197,608 23.34 6,873 8.21
Autonomous Systems 32,755 48.90 4,766 25.47
A. Absence of Inbound SAV for IPv4
For the IPv4 scan, we captured 10,964,132 A requests on
our v4.drakkardnsv4.com authoritative DNS server. It has
been shown that DNS resolvers tend to issue repetitive queries
due to proactive caching or premature querying [48]. Thus, we
leave unique tuples of the source IP address and the domain
name, which results in 8,708,747 unique requests (79.43% of
all the received request).
The IPv4 column of Table II presents the statistics gathered
from the IPv4 spoofing scan. From each request received
on our authoritative name server, we retrieve the queried
domain, extract its hexadecimal part (the destination of our
original DNS A query) and convert it to an IP address. We
then compare it to the source IP of the query and identify
6,084,302 DNS proxies (local resolvers that forwarded their
queries to other recursive resolvers) and 409,394 non-proxies
(local resolvers that performed resolutions themselves). We
immediately check whether the spoofed queries are followed
by the non-spoofed ones to see which resolvers are open. We
identify that 63.78% of forwarders and as many as 90.52% of
non-forwarders are closed resolvers.
The address encoded in the domain name identifies the
originator network. We associate every IP address with the
corresponding prefix and the autonomous system number
using pyasn4. They originate from 32,755 ASes vulnerable
to IPv4 spoofing and correspond to 197,608 prefixes (48.90%
and 23.34% out of all ASes and longest matching prefixes
present in the BGP routing table, respectively) and 938,472
IPv4 /24 blocks.
B. Absence of Inbound SAV for IPv6
The IPv4 experiment was immediately followed by the
IPv6 scan. We analyze all the A requests received on our
v6.drakkardnsv6.com authoritative name server. Note that
our target list is composed of IPv6 addresses leveraged from
the IPv6 Hitlist Service and our dual-stack scan by traversing
from IPv4 to IPv6-only zones as discussed in Section IV-E. We
received 289,737 A requests on our authoritative nameserver
and filtered out duplicate queries, resulting in 119,524 unique
ones (41.25%).
4https://pypi.org/project/pyasn/
We present the rest of the results in the IPv6 column of Ta-
ble II. 108,695 IPv6 DNS resolvers responded to our spoofed
requests, most of them being forwarders. Importantly, 57,776
resolvers were discovered by traversing from IPv4 to IPv6,
72,514 from IPv6 hitlist, whereas 21,595 appeared in both
groups. The results highlight the added value of the proposed
method to identify IPv6 addresses by sending spoofed requests
to dual-stack resolvers as explained in Section IV-E. The
majority of the responding resolvers are closed (92.43% of
forwarders and 96.41% of non-forwarders) and would not be
detectable otherwise without our spoofing technique.
The absolute numbers of vulnerable to spoofing IPv6 net-
works are lower compared to the IPv4 scan, which is normal
given that we did not scan the whole IPv6 address space, but
rather its subset. However, our findings (7,698 /40 networks
and 6,873 BGP prefixes) are distributed across 4,766 different
autonomous systems (25.47 % of all those present in the BGP
routing table).
C. Presence of Inbound SAV for IPv4 and IPv6
We perform open resolver scans to reveal not only the
absence but also the presence of inbound SAV. In Sections
V-A and V-B, we have analyzed the requests received on our
authoritative name servers. Now, we examine the responses
to our non-spoofed queries on our scanning host.
To enumerate open resolvers, we retrieve the query re-
sponses with the NOERROR reply code [33]. Even if we
notice that the answer section does not always return what
is specified in our zone files, for this study, we do not check
the integrity of those responses. In total, we identify 3,607,008
IPv4 and 13,899 IPv6 open resolvers, 24.98% and 1.33% of
which are forwarders. Interestingly, 1,283 IPv4 and 1 IPv6
response arrived from the private or unallocated ranges of
IP addresses. Previous work has shown that this behavior is
related to NAT misconfiguration [20].
The use of the targeted IPv6 address list [17], combined
with querying zones over different network protocols (IPv4
and IPv6), allows us to discover nearly 13 times more open
IPv6 resolvers that the previous work [18]. The identified IPv6
open resolvers can be used by malicious users in reflection
DDoS attacks [22], [18].
For every detected open resolver, we check whether this par-
ticular server resolved a spoofed query. If it did not, we assume
9TABLE III
INBOUND FILTERING GRANULARITY
Level
Vulnerable to spoofing Partially vulnerable to spoofing Non-vulnerable to spoofing
Before (%) After (%) Before (%) After (%) Before (%) After (%)
IPv4 Autonomous Systems 49.34 52.85 38.51 34.60 12.16 12.55
IPv4 BGP prefixes 58.36 62.04 22.73 18.61 18.91 19.34
IPv4 /24 networks 64.55 69.72 14.48 9.04 20.96 21.24
IPv6 Autonomous Systems 84.64 91.67 9.19 2.17 6.16 6.16
IPv6 BGP prefixes 85.14 90.85 7.30 1.56 7.56 7.59
IPv6 /40 networks 73.03 78.04 5.72 0.71 21.25 21.26
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Fig. 3. Sizes of IPv4 autonomous systems are calculated based on the number
of unique IPv4 addresses present in the BGP routing table. The cumulative
probability shows that partially vulnerable autonomous systems tend to be
bigger than vulnerable and non-vulnerable to spoofing.
that this resolver is inside a network performing inbound SAV.
We classify 37,288 IPv4 (5,079 IPv6) autonomous systems,
243,693 IPv4 (7,435 IPv6) BGP prefixes and 1,187,350 IPv4
/24 (9,775 IPv6 /40) networks as vulnerable or non-vulnerable
to inbound spoofing.
D. Partial SAV Deployment
We note that we may obtain contradictory results for a single
AS or a network. We define ASes and networks as partially
vulnerable to spoofing if we have at least two measurements
with a different outcome. Out of all the covered networks,
there are 38.51% IPv4 (9.19% IPv6) autonomous systems,
22.73% IPv4 (7.30% IPv6) BGP prefixes and 14.48% /24
IPv4 (5.72% /40 IPv6) networks that are partially vulnerable
to inbound spoofing.
One possible reason for different results for a single AS or a
network is packet losses. To test this hypothesis, we identified
all the /24 IPv4 networks with partially deployed filtering
and re-scanned them. 4,649 networks out of 171,982 did not
respond to any query. Most importantly, 64,701 (37.62%)
became consistent (most of them vulnerable to spoofing).
The remaining 102,632 /24s were still partially vulnerable.
In the IPv6 address space, we identified partially vulnerable
/40 networks and only queried those resolvers, that we scanned
before. We got updated results for 515 out of 559 /40 networks.
Only 25 of them were still partially vulnerable, others became
vulnerable to spoofing (489) and non-vulnerable (1).
E. Inferring Deployment of Inbound SAV
Based on the additional scans described above, we recom-
pute the number of vulnerable to spoofing, non-vulnerable
to spoofing, and partially vulnerable networks. We managed
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Fig. 4. Sizes of IPv4 longest matching prefixes from the BGP routing table.
Bigger prefixes are more likely to be partially vulnerable to spoofing.
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Fig. 5. Sizes of IPv6 longest matching prefixes from the BGP routing table.
Non-vulnerable prefixes tend to be the smallest.
to decrease the number of partially vulnerable networks at
all levels in both IPv4 and IPv6. Table III summarizes the
results before and after the additional measurements. We
find that only 4,679 (12.55%) IPv4 and 313 (6.16%) IPv6
ASes, for which we have measurements, deploy SAV for
inbound traffic. The rest of ASes are vulnerable or partially
vulnerable to inbound spoofing. The results indicate that as
many as 12,902 (34.60%) IPv4 and 110 (2.17%) IPv6 ASes
are partially vulnerable to spoofing. The smaller the network
size, the more consistent policies we observe, as it can be
seen for the longest matching prefixes, /24 IPv4 and /40 IPv6
networks. While /24 is a common unit of network filtering
policy measurement for IPv4 [4], [20], it still exhibits a high
level of partial deployment with 107,281 (9.04%) networks
belonging to both groups. In /40 IPv6, the number is as small
as 0.71%. Given the relatively small number of packets sent to
each /40 IPv6 network, in general, IPv6 measurements seem
to have been more affected by packet losses.
F. Impact of Network Complexity on SAV Policies
Multiple factors can influence the decision of operators
to deploy filtering in their networks. We contacted several
providers that partially deploy inbound SAV for a single
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network and asked their motivation to do so. One /24 IPv4 net-
work is logically divided into several parts. Some IP addresses
belong to virtual machines, and their OpenStack configuration
provides inbound and outbound SAV, while others are physical
servers or Internet access subscribers. Those do not have
filtering due to complexity, time, and financial issues. Another
network administrator confirmed being responsible only for
a subset of the /24 IPv4 network, thus having no control
over the other part. Indeed, upstream providers perform route
aggregation of smaller customer networks, maintained by
different entities [27] that possibly implement different anti-
spoofing policies. We check how common it is for a single
/24 network to be under different administration entities by
retrieving their corresponding WHOIS abuse contact emails.
Out of 107,281 /24 IPv4 networks that show partial inbound
SAV deployment, 1,257 have two and more contacts. While
being merely anecdotal evidence, a single network managed
by multiple entities is more likely to have partial inbound SAV
deployment.
We hypothesize that complex and dynamic networks are
challenging to maintain and therefore are more likely to
be vulnerable to spoofing. We measure network complexity
from several observable network properties. One of the most
important factors that may influence the filtering is the size
of the IP space. Figure 3 presents the cumulative distribution
of vulnerable to inbound spoofing, non-vulnerable to spoof-
ing, and partially vulnerable IPv4 AS sizes (the number of
announced IPv4 addresses in the BGP routing table). Around
70% of vulnerable to spoofing ASes have 4,096 addresses and
less, meaning that smaller ASes are less likely to perform
packet filtering at the network edge. Figures 4 and 5 show
the longest matching BGP prefix sizes. We see that almost
90% of vulnerable to inbound spoofing IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes
are /20 and /32 or smaller, respectively. It is important to
note that the sizes of partially vulnerable ASes and prefixes
are considerably larger compared to vulnerable and non-
vulnerable ones.
We also analyze AS stability in the IPv4 space as one of
the factors that may influence the decision of operators to
deploy SAV. If BGP advertisements are constantly changing,
implementing ACL-based source address filtering can be more
challenging. We define AS stability as the percentage of
prefixes that remain the same compared to all announced
prefixes in September 2019–March 2020 based on weekly
BGP announcements [12]. We find that 80% of non-vulnerable
and 78% of vulnerable to spoofing ASes advertise exactly the
same prefixes, while less (62%) of partially vulnerable ASes
are stable.
Another complexity factor in the deployment of source
address filtering is asymmetric routing, particularly for multi-
homed networks. It is important to note that strict filtering
policies apply to so-called single-homed stub ASes that con-
nect to their sole transit provider ASes [21]. The problem with
non-stub or transit providers is that they might have customer
ASes that do not announce all routes to them due to load
balancing and fault tolerance [49], [21]. It is less of an issue
for inbound spoofing since AS announcing the prefixes would
know its own IP space. However, if the customer AS has
TABLE IV
SAV COMPLIANCE DATASETS
Dataset
Networks
/24 IPv4 /40 IPv6
All 3,731 579
The Spoofer: Vulnerable 383 72
Non-vulnerable 1,669 469
All 19,870 4
Forwarder-based: Vulnerable 19,870 4
Non-vulnerable - -
All 1,181,350 9,775
Our method: Vulnerable 827,868 7,628
Non-vulnerable 252,201 2,078
Overlap (unique) 17,066 22
more dynamic policies to announce prefixes, it could result
in inconsistent filtering policies. Therefore, we define another
factor indicating network complexity: the type of AS: stub or
non-stub. In the analysis, we use the Caida AS relationship
data for IPv4 addresses [50]. We find that 92% and 95% of
ASes vulnerable and non-vulnerable to spoofing, respectively,
are stub ASes. We observe that less ASes (76%) partially
vulnerable to spoofing are stubs.
Finally, ASes peer with multiple upstream providers to
avoid a single point of failure. To be compliant, they would
have to implement filtering policies on multiple routes near
the exit routers. We define another factor reflecting network
complexity: the number of interconnections with other ASes,
or the number of peers. The ASes vulnerable to spoofing peer
with around 8 ASes on average, while ASes non-vulnerable
to spoofing peer with around 9 ASes. The average number of
peers for ASes with partial deployment is around 33 ASes.
We can conclude from the complexity variables that ASes
vulnerable and not vulnerable to spoofing have very similar
network properties. However, partially vulnerable ASes have
more complex network configurations.
G. Outbound vs. Inbound SAV Policies
Next, we evaluate the filtering policies of networks in
both directions (inbound and outbound SAV). To do so, we
aggregate the following datasets:
• The Spoofer: the Spoofer client sends packets with
the IP address of the machine on which it is running
as well as packets with a spoofed source address. The
results are anonymized per /24 IPv4 and /40 IPv6 address
blocks. Spoofer identifies four possible states: blocked
(only an unspoofed packet was received, the spoofed
packet was blocked), rewritten (the spoofed packet was
received, but its source IP address was changed on the
way), unknown (neither packet was received), received
(the spoofed packet was received by the server). We
are interested in networks belonging to the received and
blocked groups, as they indicate the certain presence or
absence of outbound filtering.
• Forwarder-based method: we deploy the technique on
our scanning server and analyze the responses in which
the originally queried IP address is not the same as the
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responding one, as described in Section IV-D. If the
destination of our original query and the source belong to
different autonomous systems, we consider the originally
queried IP to be a misconfigured forwarder, as well as the
whole /24 IPv4 or /40 IPv6 it belongs to. Consequently,
this method identifies networks lacking outbound SAV.
• Our method: as described in Section V-D, we obtain
/24 IPv4 and /40 IPv6 networks that are vulnerable and
non-vulnerable to inbound spoofing. We do not include
partially vulnerable networks.
Table IV summarizes the datasets we use and shows the
number of networks identified by each method. In March 2020,
we collected and aggregated the latest Spoofer data for one
month. Most of the tests were for /24 IPv4 networks (3,731 or
86.57%). We only keep vulnerable to spoofing (received) and
non-vulnerable to spoofing (blocked) networks. We enumerate
446,429 IPv4 and 5 IPv6 misbehaving forwarders, originating
from 19,870 /24 IPv4 and 4 /40 IPv6 vulnerable to outbound
spoofing networks. The forwarder-based method does not
identify the presence of outbound SAV. The two outbound
SAV compliance datasets (the Spoofer and forwarder-based
method) identify 20,243 IPv4 and 76 IPv6 unique networks
vulnerable to outbound spoofing, while 1,669 IPv4 and 469
IPv6 networks are non-vulnerable.
From our dataset, we use vulnerable and non-vulnerable
to inbound spoofing networks. The overlap (in terms of the
number of tested networks) between our inbound method and
the remaining two outbound datasets is 17,066 /24 IPv4 and
22 /40 IPv6 networks. Among those, there are 5,557 and
7 networks (/24 IPv4 and /40 IPv6 respectively), that have
no SAV policy in place in either direction. 256 IPv4 (12
IPv6) networks deployed outbound filtering only and 11,168
IPv4 (0 IPv6) have only inbound SAV in place. Only 86
IPv4 and 3 IPv6 networks have secured their inbound and
outbound traffic properly. The results suggest that inbound
filtering is more deployed than outbound, which is in line with
the economic incentives of providers: the deployment of SAV
for inbound traffic protects the provider network rather than
other networks. That said, the results must be interpreted with
caution due to the relatively smaller number of measurements
for outbound SAV and the limitations of each measurement
method.
We now analyze whether at the AS level inbound filtering
is also more prevalent. One of the most well-known initiatives
to improve the security and resilience of the Internets global
routing system is Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Secu-
rity regulations (MANRS) [51]. At the time of writing, there
are 515 autonomous systems that are its signatories. MANRS
requires its members to implement SAV in their networks
“to prevent packets with an incorrect source IP address from
entering or leaving the network” [51]. However, it has been
shown that inbound filtering tends to be less deployed than
outbound [20]. 81 MANRS autonomous systems out of 515
are vulnerable to outbound spoofing, as shown by the Spoofer
and forwarder-based datasets. However, as many as 114 and
207 ASes are fully and partially vulnerable to inbound spoof-
ing. Therefore, the results suggest that when network operators
are familiar with the concept of SAV, they tend to secure traffic
TABLE V
FINGERPRINTING DUAL-STACK CANDIDATE PAIRS
Protocol/
Application
Both
closed
Only
IPv4
open
Only
IPv6
open
Both
open
Same fingerprint
DNS (version.bind) 16,743 13,081 1,743 50,015 37,338 (45.77%)
DNS (PTR) 11,380 38,104 1,152 30,946 24,004 (29.42%)
NTP 67,009 2,034 2,498 10,041 128 (0.16%)
HTTP 27,406 15,986 3,292 34,898 34,218 (41.94%)
HTTPS 29,106 16,806 675 34,995 22,531 (22.62%)
SSH 33,825 2,055 2,442 43,260 5,622 (6.89%)
SMTP 47,597 10,140 653 23,192 23,060 (28.27%)
Total (unique) 61,313 (75.16%)
leaving their networks.
H. SAV Deployment for IPv4 and IPv6
As IPv6 deployment is growing, it becomes an attractive
attack target. Individual dual-stacked machines and networks
are generally more open on the IPv6 part [14]. In this
section, we analyze whether dual-stacked networks are more
vulnerable to inbound spoofing using IPv6. We do it at the
individual host and autonomous system levels.
1) Individual Host Level: All the non-forwarding IPv4 and
IPv6 DNS resolvers (either open or closed) were queried
for a domain name requiring traversal to IPv6 and IPv4,
respectively. Out of 2,609,802 IPv4 and 36,372 IPv6 non-
proxies, 2.65% and 28.52% had IPv6 and IPv4 connectivity,
respectively, thus forming IPv4-IPv6 candidate address pairs.
Clearly, due to the IPv6 adoption being far from universal [52],
[53], [54], it is crucial for IPv6 resolvers to be reachable over
IPv4 as well.
We collected 81,582 candidate address pairs in total, most of
them (70,693) during the IPv4 scan. DNS resolvers are known
to have complex relationships and a single address can appear
in multiple address pairs [30]. However, for our analysis, we
consider each address pair separately.
We fingerprint each address in the pair as described in
Section IV-F. Table V presents the results per address pair.
Importantly, almost 98.13% of pairs were open on at least
one fingerprinting protocol/application. The most open ones
are version.bind and SSH, which is consistent with the fact
that we deal with DNS servers requiring remote access. While
NTP is relatively open, in most cases, we merely extracted
the timestamp. Only 128 server pairs returned software and
operating system versions. Among all the open pairs, 75.16%
show strong evidence that they belong to the same machine.
We got confirmation from several network operators that our
candidate pairs indeed belonged to single physical machines.
Most of the resolvers in the pairs show the absence or
presence of SAV. However, there are cases when we discover
an IPv6 resolver through IPv4, send a spoofed and a non-
spoofed query, and do not get any results. We observe similar
behavior in the opposite direction. From 61,313 dual-stacked
pairs, 42,784 reveal the absence or presence of spoofing for
IPv4 and IPv6. Most of them (99,24%) have consistent filtering
policies. However, out of the remaining 324 hosts, 195 are
vulnerable to inbound spoofing only over IPv6. Thus, at the
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TABLE VI
GEOLOCATION RESULTS
Rank
Resolvers (#) Networks, vulnerable to spoofing (#)
Proportion of networks,
vulnerable to spoofing (%)
Country IPv4 Country IPv6 Country IPv4 Country IPv6 Country IPv4
1 China 1,970,410 USA 22,992 China 260,047 USA 1,319 Kosovo 63.64
2 Brazil 667,036 Germany 13,373 USA 162,259 Brazil 930 Comoros 52.63
3 USA 661,943 Netherlands 11,514 Russia 54,451 Germany 680 Western Sahara 50.00
4 Iran 404,134 Belarus 7,455 Italy 32,026 Netherlands 336 Armenia 49.46
5 India 348,491 Russia 6,410 Brazil 28,836 United Kingdom 309 Maldives 39.65
6 Algeria 249,931 China 5,840 Japan 27,890 China 304 Moldova 38.16
7 Russia 224,985 United Kingdom 5,151 India 27,426 Russia 289 Niue 37.50
8 Indonesia 222,602 Spain 3,996 Mexico 23,288 Czech Republic 254 Palestine 36.32
9 Italy 105,476 Czech Republic 3,357 United Kingdom 16,976 France 223 Afganistan 36.18
10 Argentina 104,850 France 2,837 Indonesia 16,798 Japan 183 Bulgaria 35.98
individual host level, IPv6 tends to be slightly more vulnerable
than IPv4.
2) Autonomous System Level: Whenever a certain security
policy exists for an individual dual-stacked host, it is likely
to hold for the whole autonomous system [14]. Consequently,
we expect inbound SAV to be less deployed over IPv6 at the
autonomous system level as well. As of March 2020, there are
66,978 IPv4 and 18,710 IPv6 ASNs present in BGP routing
tables. 18,016 of them are common.
For this analysis, we choose vulnerable and non-vulnerable
to spoofing ASNs and keep those having results in both IPv4
and IPv6. The resulting set includes 2,096 ASes. The great
majority of them (91.13%) have consistent filtering policies
for IPv4 and IPv6—1,775 are vulnerable and 135 are non-
vulnerable to inbound spoofing. However, our results indicate
that the remaining 186 ASNs are not vulnerable to inbound
spoofing over IPv4 (89.78% deployed inbound SAV) but are
vulnerable over IPv6. Thus, at the AS level, SAV is less
deployed over IPv6.
VI. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION
Identifying the countries that do not comply with the SAV
standard is the first step in mitigating the issue by, for example,
contacting local CSIRTs. We use the MaxMind database5 to
map every resolver IP address of the spoofed query retrieved
from the domain name to its country. Table VI summarizes
the results.
In total, we identified 232 countries and territories vulner-
able to spoofing of incoming network traffic for either IPv4,
IPv6, or both. We first compute the number of DNS resolvers
per country. As explained in Section V-B, the coverage of
the IPv6 scan is smaller than that of IPv4, which is why we
see less identified resolvers. Interestingly, only 3 countries are
present in both IPv4 and IPv6 top 10 resolver ranking.
We now map the resolvers to the corresponding /24 IPv4 and
/40 IPv6 address blocks to evaluate the number of vulnerable
to spoofing networks per country. We see that the top 10
countries by the number of DNS resolvers are not the same
as the top 10 for vulnerable to spoofing networks because a
large number of individual DNS resolvers by itself does not
indicate how they are distributed across different networks.
5https://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoip2/geolite2/
Fig. 6. Fraction of vulnerable to spoofing (inbound traffic) vs. all /24 IPv4
networks per country (in %)
Such absolute numbers are still not representative as coun-
tries with a large Internet infrastructure may have many DNS
resolvers and therefore reveal many vulnerable to spoofing
networks that represent a small proportion of the whole. For
this reason, we compute the fraction of vulnerable to spoofing
vs. all /24 IPv4 networks per country. To determine the number
of all the /24 networks per country, we map all the individual
IPv4 addresses to their location, then to the nearest /24 block,
and keep the country/territory to which most addresses of a
given network belong. Figure 6 presents the resulting world
map. We can see in Table VI that the top 10 ranking has
changed. Small countries such as Western Sahara and Niue,
which have two and eight identified resolvers each, suffer from
a high proportion of vulnerable to spoofing networks. One
of the two /24 networks of Western Sahara allows inbound
spoofing. On the other hand, Bulgaria is a country with a large
Internet infrastructure (16,439 /24 networks in total) and with
a large relative number of vulnerable to spoofing networks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a novel method to infer
the deployment of inbound SAV for IPv4 and IPv6 address
spaces. Our measurements covered more than 55% of all IPv4
autonomous systems (27% for IPv6) and 28% of all IPv4 BGP
prefixes (8% for IPv6). We show that over 90% of those are
fully or partially vulnerable to inbound spoofing.
Open DNS resolvers have been extensively used for reflec-
tion and amplification DDoS attacks in recent years. We found
3,615,781 IPv4 and 13,899 IPv6 open resolvers, the latter
being 13 times more than the previous work. New ways to
misuse open resolvers are constantly emerging. One of the
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most-recently discovered attacks, namely the NXNSAttack,
can exploit open recursive resolvers in DDoS attacks to
reach an amplification factor of up to 1620. Even worse, the
NXNSAttack can be combined with inbound spoofing: this
provides an additional 4,251,189 closed resolvers for IPv4
(103,012 for IPv6) that can either be attacked themselves or
misused against other victims.
Open resolvers, when not resolving spoofed queries, iden-
tify the presence of inbound SAV. We found that while
many providers deploy consistent filtering policies network-
wide, there are cases when a single network is only partially
protected from inbound spoofing. The results indicate that
network complexity is one of the factors that prevent operators
from correctly configuring packet filtering. Overall, the pro-
portion of non-vulnerable networks is much lower compared
to partially or fully vulnerable to inbound spoofing.
We have identified and fingerprinted dual-stacked DNS
resolvers and shown that at the individual host level inbound
filtering is slightly less deployed in IPv6 than IPv4. This
also holds for dual-stack autonomous systems. This finding
is not surprising given that IPv6 address space tends to be
less secured than IPv4.
We have gathered different datasets to analyze whether out-
bound filtering is less deployed than inbound. Outbound SAV
faces the problem of misaligned economic incentives—it pro-
tects other networks but not the one deploying it. Interestingly,
SAV for outbound traffic turned out to be more deployed than
inbound at the AS level among network operators committed
to the MANRS initiative. The absence of outbound packet
filtering gained widespread attention since it is the reason
for DDoS attacks. Under these circumstances, the SAV of
inbound traffic remained neglected (or overlooked) by network
operators.
Vulnerability to inbound spoofing is not limited to any geo-
graphic territory and is spread worldwide. To draw attention to
the problem of inbound spoofing, we launched the Closed Re-
solver Project at https://closedresolver.com. Anyone
can visit the website of the project and check whether his/her
network is vulnerable to inbound spoofing and how many
closed resolvers we found inside. The ultimate objective is to
run notification campaigns for network operators and provide
them with an accessible platform to investigate results for
their networks. This may be particularly useful for operators
planning to become a MANRS participant since it requires
deploying Source Address Validation. We expect these efforts
to result in better packet filtering on the Internet.
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